ABSTRACT Social networking has become part of our life in recent years, allowing users to converse and connect with people sharing similar interests in real world. However, networking via the social media suffers from serious privacy issues, and one of which is profile attribute leakage in friend discovery. While existing studies mainly focus on leveraging rich cryptographic algorithms to prevent privacy leak, we propose a novel perturbation-based private profile matching mechanism by mixing the private data with random noise to preserve privacy in this paper. In this paper, we consider the case where the profiles are fine-grained, meaning that each attribute is associated with a user-specific numerical value to indicate the level of interest. By carefully tuning the amount of information owned by each party, we guarantee that privacy is effectively preserved while the matching result of users' profiles can be cooperatively obtained. We first give an introduction to a basic scheme, then detail two improved ones by, respectively, taking collusion attack and verifiability into consideration. As no expensive encryption algorithms get involved, our methods are computationally efficient; thus they are more practical for real-world applications. Theoretical security analysis as well as comparison-based simulation studies are carried out to evaluate the performance of our designs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networking via the social media has become more and more popular in recent years. The advances of smart portable devices and mobile applications have been pushing the development of social networking even further [1] - [3] . One of the many reasons that make social networking an indispensable part of our life is that it provides a fairly convenient platform for people to make new connections. With social networking, people may look for friends with common interests [4] , [5] or missed connections [6] , [7] . The underlying mechanism that enables friending in social networks is through profile matching. However, a user's personal profile is very likely to contain sensitive information such as personal backgrounds, hobbies, life styles, and professions [8] - [11] , which makes the users reluctant to disclose their personal profiles.
Such a privacy concern hinders the wide adoption of many exciting social network applications [9] - [12] . One way to address this privacy concern is private profile matching.
Intuitively, achieving profile matching while simultaneously preserving the users' privacy can be accomplished by secure multi-party computation (SMC) [13] , which enables the calculations to be carried out on the participants' sensitive data without privacy disclosure. However, secure multi-party computation suffers from high computation/communication cost, which usually renders the corresponding methods impractical for real-world adoptions [14] . Hence, state-of-art literature on private profile matching is trending in two directions: private set intersection and private dot-product, with the former mainly being used for coarse-grained private matching, where either private set intersection (PSI) [15] , [16] or private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) [17] , [18] is adopted, and the latter mostly being employed for the cases when user's profile data is finegrained [19] - [23] . Note that Homomorphic cryptography [24] - [26] is often adopted for private dot product computation, which inevitably yields high computational overhead.
Different from existing literature, which generally relies on computationally expensive cryptographic primitives, we consider the problem of private profile matching from a completely different angle. More specifically, we propose a highly efficient perturbation-based scheme for fine-grained private profile matching in this paper. To present the finegrained data, we associate each attribute with a user-specific numerical value that indicates the level of interests. Such a transformation allows us to represent each user's profile with a vector consisting of a set of attribute values, so that a secure dot-product protocol can be used to measure the similarity of two profiles. To tackle the problem of private data preservation, we propose to add a certain amount of noise to the private data to hide the information from other users, which guarantees that the information obtained by each party is strictly limited. By this way, the privacy of each user can be preserved, and the similarity of the two profiles can be precisely computed from the user-specific vectors after the noises are canceled out.
To further ensure data privacy, we do not utilize centralized servers in our model as they cannot always be relied upon. Instead, we propose a novel cooperative framework in a completely distributed way. Our essential idea is to conduct private profile matching between two users with the help of others. In such a cooperative environment, each party has limited knowledge about the information used for matching while the private profile is only known by the corresponding owner. Note that, providing incentives for the users to cooperate is an important topic, which is beyond the scope of this paper. There exist various mechanisms [27] - [29] addressing the cooperation incentives. A simple motivation could be that a user must be willing to contribute for computation in order to use the application for friend making.
The multifold contributions of this paper are briefly summarized as follows:
1) We propose a highly efficient scheme (the basic scheme) for private preserving profile matching. Compared to previous research, our proposed scheme significantly improves the private matching performance in terms of efficiency and practicality. 2) We extend our basic scheme to a collusion resistant one and a verifiable one that can be used in different applications. The extended schemes are more secure and practical. 3) We theoretically prove the correctness of the proposed schemes and investigate their security strengths and efficiency. 4) We evaluate our proposed schemes by comparing them with the exiting state-of-the-art, and the results demonstrate that our protocols can achieve much higher efficiency. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview on the related work about privacy concerns in mobile social networks. Section III presents the system model and threat model. Section IV details the proposed schemes, including the basic scheme and the two enhanced ones considering collusion resistance and verifiability. Our security analysis and performance evaluation are reported in Section V, and we summarize our work and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
To enable friending while preserving the privacy of the personal profiles, private matching has been extensively studied. Most existing work is based on Private Set Intersection (PSI) [15] , [16] or Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) [17] , [18] , in which two mistrusted parties with each having a private set jointly compute the intersection or the intersection cardinality of the two private sets. Different variants of PSI and PSI-CA have been developed, which provide the cryptographic foundation for many private matching schemes such as those proposed in [7] and [30] - [33] . These mechanisms are usually designed based on Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC). Nevertheless, general SMC techniques [34] heavily rely on cryptography, and are well-known for their inefficiency. Although various solutions have been proposed to improve efficiency, they are still impractical when applied to mobile devices due to the high computational and/or communication overheads.
Secure dot-product calculation is another popular approach to achieve private profile matching in friend discovery. Dong et al. [20] presented novel techniques and protocols that do not use the intersection (cardinality) of users' attribute sets; instead, they measured the closeness or similarity between two nodes in an online social network, and the encrypted social coordinates were used for the computation of secure dot-product to discover potential friends. Similarly, Zhang et al. [35] proposed a protocol that supports finegrained personal profiles and calculates the profile distance via secure dot-product. Such an approach enables finer differentiation among the users with different levels of interest for the same attribute. Note that these protocols are all built on Paillier Cryptosystem [36] , which has a prohibitively high computational overhead rendering them impractical for realworld applications.
Another mechanism that differs from those PSI based approaches was proposed in [37] , which utilizes a common secret shared by the initiator and the matching user. This approach employs the request profile as a key, and only a matching user who possesses the same secret can decrypt the message. From the perspective of cryptography, the generated key in this work is not truly random and thus is not sufficiently secure.
A few recent work on private profile matching consider the weights of the attributes in a user's profiles [38] , [39] ; VOLUME 5, 2017 accordingly, weighted dissimilarity is used to measure the distance between two users. More specifically, each attribute is given a weight and the total dissimilarity of two profiles are computed by taking the weights into consideration. In [38] , multiple servers are utilized and private profile matching is achieved as long as one server is honest. This scheme employs the Homomorphic encryption based on the Elgamal cryptosystem whose computational overhead is high. In [39] , garbled bloom filter was employed to calculate the weighted dissimilarity. This work also adopts the Paillier cryptosystem, which has a high computational overhead as well.
In summary, existing work mentioned above suffer from the following weaknesses:
• Protocols usually incur very high computational overhead due to the adoption of secure multiparty computations or homomorphic cryptosystems.
• The results are not verifiable. Take secure multiparty computation based protocols as an example: when the protocols end, the calculated result is only known by one party (say, Alice) and thus it has to be transmitted to the other party when needed. Such a mechanism relies on the assumption that the sending party (i.e., Alice) is trust-worthy, which is not always true in practice.
• The protocols are vulnerable to collusion attacks if trusted third parties are employed. Therefore, it is desirable to design efficient protocols that are resistant to collusion attacks, whereby the result is verifiable by both parties.
In this paper, we propose a novel perturbation-based private profile matching scheme that is computationally efficient. A nice property of our scheme lies in that data privacy is strictly preserved without employing any expensive cryptographic algorithms. In addition, our design is based on fine-grained profiles, which can reflect a user's interests more accurately. We also consider collusion resistance and verifiability by proposing two enhanced mechanisms to tackle these challenges, which are largely ignored by the existing research.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND THREAT MODEL A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider Alice with profile U =< U 1 , . . . , U d > and Bob with profile V =< V 1 , . . . , V d > as two exemplary users. If these two profile vectors consist of only binary values, i.e., they are binary vectors, their dot product can be calculated to measure the similarity of the two users. For example, given a global list of attributes, each user is assigned a vector with '0's or '1's, where '0' means that the user does not have the attribute and '1' otherwise. The dot-product of two binary vectors essentially captures the number of matches ('1's) between the two users, which offers an effective way to evaluate how many common attributes the two users have and can be used to predict new relationships.
When the user's profile vectors consist of real numbers, it is straightforward to measure the similarity using the 1 distance (also called the Manhattan distance). As computing the dot-product of two binary vectors is very efficient, we intend to convert the two real-valuded vectors U and V into binary vectors u and v, and then compute the 1 distance based on the dot product of u and v. Such a conversion to allow the dot-product of the converted binary vectors to facilitate the 1 distance calculation can be realized by an approach proposed in [35] . For completeness we detail the procedure in [35] as follows.
Assume that each of U i and V j is in [0, γ − 1]. Then for ∀x ∈ [0, γ − 1], we define a binary vector h(x) = (x 1 , . . . , x γ −1 ), where x i is equal to one for 1 i x and zero for x < i γ − 1. We further abuse the notation by defining binary vectors
Therefore, the 1 distance of two users' profiles can be calculated using the dot-product of u and v. If one user, with profile u for example, is able to compute the dot-product, then he could send
i −2u·v to the other user to compute the 1 distance. Moreover, since
are scalar values that do not disclose any element of u and v, transferring
i to Bob and
Therefore, we focus on computing the dot-product of the profile vectors in unary forms converted by the above approach. Our goal is to securely and efficiently compute the actual value of a dot-product. We assume that the computation is conducted between an initiator Alice P a and a candidate Bob P b owning private unary vectors u and v, respectively, with the help of a group of helpers {Helper 1 , Helper 2 ,. . . , Helper k }, where k ≥ 1. P a initializes the protocol, and P b computes the result of the dot product. We will use Alice and P a interchangeably; so are Bob and P b . We further assume that the noise vector is also in unary form.
We use the 128-bit AES cryptosystem [40] for end-toend encryption. All messages sent among the participants are encrypted using AES. To make it simpler, we omit the encryption part in the description of the schemes.
B. THREAT MODEL
We assume the semi-honest model [41] , where the participants follow the protocols honestly, but each attempts to learn more information about others. An adversary could be either an outsider or an insider; an insider adversary is a participant who would like to infer private information of others, and an outsider adversary is an attacker who eavesdrops on the traffic and tries to obtain private information of the participants.
In our system, helpers can collude with the each other or collude with users in order to infer private information of u and v. We assume more than half helpers are honest in this system, and the security is based on the majority of the participants.
IV. COOPERATIVE PRIVACY PRESERVING FRIEND DISCOVERY
In this section, we present three schemes meeting different levels of security, efficiency, and generality. To be specific, we first propose a basic scheme and discuss possible extensions to prevent different malicious attacks; then we elaborate two enhanced ones that provide higher level of protection in exchange of more overhead. The users can customize their requirements of protection levels.
A. BASIC SCHEME
We first describe a simple and extremely efficient scheme for secure dot-product computations. This basic scheme provides a practical solution to common problems such as weighted average and hamming distance, just to name a few.
We first provide an overview on the construction of the basic scheme. To encode an input vector u, the initiator Alice chooses a random vector r which has the same dimension as u. She then outputs x = u + r and sends x to Bob P b , while the random noise r is sent to Helper. Note that x and r form an additive secret sharing of u, and neither x nor r can be used independently to directly derive u. As a result, the private vector u is kept confidential to the initiator Alice, as long as the candidate P b and Helper do not collude with each other. This data share distribution procedure is illustrated in Fig.1 .
After receiving x from the initiator, the candidate P b locally computes < v, x >. Apparently, we have
To obtain the dot-product < v, u >, the candidate P b needs to add the negative value of < v, r >, which is calculated with the help of Helper. Next, we introduce how to obtain < v, r > at Helper. Helper has already received r from the initiator in the previous step. It needs to get v to obtain < v, r >. However, v is private to P b . Similar to the initiator, the candidate P b chooses a noise s of the same dimension as v, and sends y = v + s to Helper. By this way, the privacy of v is preserved. Meanwhile, the noise vector s is sent to the initiator P a .
Next, Helper locally computes < y, r >=< v + s, r >, while P a locally computes < s, r > and returns < s, r > to Helper. Finally, Helper is able to obtain < v, r > as follows:
After getting < v, r >, Helper sends it to the candidate P b , and P b obtains the dot-product < v, u > according to (3) .
Note that all the transmitted data is either noise or a vector mixed with noise; thus no private data is revealed. In other words, we carefully assign partial information to each party by adopting the concept of information hiding to make sure that the profile privacy can not be inferred, yet the dot-product can be obtained.
We summarize our basic mechanism in Algorithm 1.
B. COLLUSION RESISTANT SCHEME
In the basic mechanism, a helping user is involved in secure dot-product computation. Specifically, the private vector is concealed to get a mixed one by adding a certain amount of noise. Then the noise vector and the mixed vector is separately distributed to two different users. These two users cannot independently reveal the private information of the original vector as one knows only the noise and the other knows the mixed one hiding the private vector by the noise. However, if they collude, the private vector can be obtained.
A possible extension to improve the robustness is to slice the noise into several pieces, and send each piece to a helping node. In this approach, many different users are involved, and a collusion attack can succeed if and only if all the involved helpers and the user receiving the mixed vector collude together, which is not easy when the number of helping nodes is large. Such a countermeasure requires more helping users to prevent collusion attack, say k different users {Helper 1 , Helper 2 , . . . , Helper k }. In the following, we detail the scheme with multiple helping users for collusion resistance. 2) Bob computes the dot-product < v, u + r >.
3) Helper computes the dot-product < v + s, r >, then subtracts the received < s, r > to get < v, r >, sends < v, r > to Bob.
Reconstruction
Bob receives < v, r > from Helper, then computes
We first consider the case of Bob trying to collude with the helping users, and then introduce a mechanism that prevents such an attack.
The Initiator: Instead of sending r to one helper, the initiator slices it into k pieces {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k } and sends each piece to k different users {Helper 1 The data share distribution of this process is illustrated in Fig.2 . When the data share distribution phase is done, Initiator P a computes dot-product < s, r > and sends it back to the candidate P b . Meanwhile candidate P b is able to compute < v, u + r > as it receives (u + r) from P a in the data share distribution phase. After receiving all the partial results from k different helping nodes, candidate P b can obtain
The complete process is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Similarly, to prevent the initiator Alice from colluding with the helping nodes, we slice Bob's noise vector s into k pieces with k i=1 s i = s, and send v + s i to the ith helping node Helper i . Thus the partial result returned from the ith helping node will be < v + s i , r > , which will result in the sum as
The initiator will conduct the same procedure as in the basic mechanism except that the noise r is sent to k different helping nodes. This process is illustrated in Fig.3 . Eventually, the candidate node will obtain i) < v, u + r >, which computed locally; ii) < s, r >, which is returned from the initiator; and iii) k < v, r > + < s, r > by summing up all the partial results from the helping nodes. Then the following calculations are performed:
(1)
We summarize the process in Algorithm 3. In this collusion resistant scheme, a higher level of protection is achieved at the expense of a larger communication overhead. But the computation involves only basic additions and multiplications. No expensive homomorphic encryption or exponentiation is employed. Please note that we consider the case when the helping nodes collude with either initiator or candidate. The case of helping nodes colluding with both the initiator and the candidate simultaneously is unusual, hence is not considered in this paper.
C. VERIFIABLE SCHEME
In our basic and collusion-resistant schemes, the initiator sends an invitation to the candidate. After all the message 
exchanges, the candidate obtains the secure dot-product of the initiator's vector and its private vector. Apparently, the final result of dot-product is only known by one party. Next, we introduce a protocol whereby the result is verifiable by both parties. For both parties to obtain the dot-product, the initiator and the candidate run two separate instances of the protocol in parallel.
To realize verification, some slight modifications based on the basic mechanism are required. To be specific, we utilize two helpers to cooperate with Alice and Bob to compute the dot-product. The detailed steps are described as follows:
Step 1: The initiator Alice generates a noise vector r and mixes it with her private vector u, then sends the resulted (u + r) to candidate Bob. Alice also chooses another noise vector α, then sends both r and the new mixed vector (u + α) to a helping node Helper 1 , and sends both r and α to Helper 2 . Similarly, Bob mixes his vector v with noise vector s and sends (v + s) to Alice. Bob also chooses a new noise vector β, then sends (s, v + β) to Helper 1 , and sends s and β to Helper 2 .
Note that neither Alice nor Bob is able to figure out the profile of the other since the profiles are masked by a random vector.
Step 2: Alice, Bob and the helpers compute dot-products based on the data in their hands:
Then the two helpers send b and c to Alice, and send b and c to Bob.
Step 3: Alice can finally get the dot-product < u, v >= (a) − ((b) − (c)). The same procedure is conducted by Bob to get the dot-product < v, u >= a − (b − c ).
The data share distribution of the verifiable scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4 and the algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 4. Now both Alice and Bob obtain the dot-product. A naive verification approach might be to encrypt the dot-product and send it to each other, then the other party decrypts it and compares with the locally computed result for consistency. A challenge-response procedure can also be performed for consistency guarantee. 2) Bob computes < v, u + r >.
3) Helper 1 computes < v + β, r > and sends it to Bob. It also computes < u + α, s > and sends it to Alice. 3) Helper 2 computes < β, r > and sends it to Bob. It also computes < α, s > and sends it to Alice. It is further noted that the verifiable mechanism can be extended to a collusion-resistant version by utilizing two group of helpers as Helper 1 and Helper 2 . Alice can slice r and Bob can slice s and send them to the helpers. With the help of two groups of helpers, both Alice and Bob are able to compute the dot-product. We omit the details here as the procedure can be obtained by bringing the ideas of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 to Algorithm 4.
Reconstruction 1) Alice gets
< u, v >=< u, v + s > + < u + α, s > − < α, s >. 2) Bob gets < u, v >=< v, u + r > + < v + β, r > − < β, r >.
V. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, we theoretically prove the correctness, and analyze the security strength and computational complexity of the proposed schemes. As the collusion resistant scheme and verifiable scheme are extended from the basic one, we omit the discussion of the basic scheme here.
A. CORRECTNESS

Theorem 1:
In the collusion resistant mechanism (Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3), candidate P b (Bob) is able to correctly compute the dot-product < u, v >.
Proof: We first study the correctness of Algorithm 2. Upon receiving u + r from P a , P b is able to compute
When all the helpers send < v+s, r i > to P b , he aggregates the data and calculates:
Upon receiving sr from P a (Alice), P b (Bob) is able to compute < u, v > by computing:
We now study the correctness of Algorithm 3. Upon receiving u + r from P a , P b is able to compute
When all the helpers send < v+s i , r > to P b , he aggregates the data and calculates:
Finally, upon receiving sr from P a , P b is able to compute < u, v > by calculating:
This completes the proof. Theorem 2: In the verifiable mechanism (Algorithm 4), both P a (Alice) and P b (Bob) are able to correctly compute the dot-product < u, v >.
Proof: We prove this theorem by investigating the behaviors of P a and P b separately.
1) For P a : Upon receiving (v + s) from P b , she computes < u, v + s > and saves it locally. When P a receives < α, s > from Helper 2 and < u + α, s > from Helper 1 , she computes:
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2) For P b : Upon receiving u + r from P a , he computes < u + r, v > and saves it locally. When P b receives < β, r > from Helper 2 and < v+β, r > from Helper 1 , he computes:
This completes the proof.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 3: In the proposed schemes, an outsider attacker who successfully intercepts all the messages is not able to obtain u, v or the dot-product < u, v >.
Proof: We prove Theorem 3 based on the hardness of breaking AES cryptosystem. In our proposed protocols, the private vector u and v are masked by different noise vectors, then encrypted with 128-bit AES. Furthermore, the noise information transmitted in the traffic is also encrypted with AES. To calculate u or v, an attacker who eavesdrops on the traffic has to first decrypt the messages to obtain the masked vector and the corresponding noise, then cancel out the noise to obtain the true private vector. For example, in the basic scheme, an attacker has to intercept the messages of (u + r) and r, then successfully decrypt (u + r) and r in order to compute u. However, to successfully decrypt a message in the traffic, an attacker has to perform a brute-force attack on the AES cryptosystem, which is known to be computationally infeasible. Therefore, even an outsider attacker is powerful enough to intercept all the exchanged messages, it is not able to obtain u or v.
To compute the dot-product < u, v >, an attacker has to meet one of the following requirements: 1) The attacker has the knowledge of u and v, which has been proved to be computationally infeasible. 2) The attacker is able to compute < u, v > directly based on the intercepted vectors. However, the attacker cannot decrypt the vectors and thus is not able to compute < u, v > in this way.
Therefore, we conclude that an outsider attacker who successfully intercepts all the messages is not able to obtain u, v or the dot-product < u, v >.
Theorem 4: In Algorithm 2, neither the candidate P b (Bob) nor the helpers are able to infer the profile of the initiator P a (Alice) unless they all collude with each other.
Proof: In Algorithm 2, candidate P b is not able to know P a 's profile u because he only has information of (u + r), where u is masked by a random value r. The helpers are not able to infer u either because each of them only has one share of r (r i ), which is not related to the value of u. To obtain P a 's private vector u, P b has to collude with all the helpers so that u can be obtained by computing u + r − k i=1 (r i ). Therefore, we conclude that neither the candidate P b (Bob) nor the helpers in Algorithm 2 are able to infer the profile of the initiator P a (Alice) unless they all collude with each other. Theorem 5: In Algorithm 3, neither the initiator P a nor the helpers are able to infer the profile of the candidate P b unless they all collude with each other.
Proof: In Algorithm 3, candidate P b masks his value v by adding a random noise vector s i and sends the mixed vector (v + s i ) to Helper i . Helper i only has the information of (v + s i ), where v is masked by a random vector s i . P a is not able to know v either because she only receives the noise s that is not related to v. To obtain v, P a has to collude with all the helpers in order to aggregate the helpers' data, so that v can be obtained by computing (
Therefore, we conclude that neither the initiator P a nor the helpers in Algorithm 3 are able to infer the profile of the candidate P b unless they all collude with each other.
Theorem 6: In the verifiable scheme, no entity is able to infer the users' profiles without collusion.
Proof: We prove this theorem by separately studying each of the entity in this protocol .
1) P a : P a is not able to infer P b 's profile v because the message she receives is (v + s), indicating that v is masked with a random vector s. 2) P b : P b is not able to infer P a 's profile u because the message he receives is (u + r), indicating thaat u is masked with a random vector r. 3) Helper 1 : Helper 1 receives (r, u+α) from P a and (s, v+ β) from P b , where u is masked by a random vector α, and v is masked by a random vector β. Therefore Helper 1 is not able to infer u or v without other entities' help. 4) Helper 2 : Helper 2 receives only noise values from P a and P b , therefore it is not able to infer u or v without other entities' help. Therefore, we conclude that no entity is able to infer the users' profiles without a collusion in the verifiable scheme. In summary, the proposed schemes achieve private profile matching by securely computing the dot-product of two users's profiles. In our schemes, only the noise vector and the profile vector mixed with the noise are sent out instead of the original vector. In this way, the privacy is effectively protected. Also, the computation of the private vectors' dotproduct is based on the partial results computed by different parties, while the partial results reveal no private information. Therefore, the privacy is preserved because the information sent out reveals no private information, and the computed result of each party reveals no private information. Furthermore, we consider collusion attack and verifiability and propose enhanced mechanisms for each case. In all these mechanisms, we guarantee that neither the candidate nor the helping nodes can infer any private information. One may argue that the collusion attack is not completely tackled in the collusion resistant scheme when all nodes collude together, but this problem commonly exists in all schemes where cooperation among different users is possible. Moreover, a functional system should have more than 50% of benign users who do not collude with others. By distributing the computation of dot-product to different helpers instead of using one centralized trusted server, our scheme is effectively resistant to collusion attack and is more practical to be used in real-world applications.
C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 1) THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the computational overhead as well as the overall execution time of our protocols in contrast to the previous work. To compare with Zhang's protocol in [35] and Dong's protocol in [20] , we set each value in the vector to be 2048-bit so that the ciphertext sizes of a vector element are the same in all the protocols. Table 2 summarizes the theoretical performance of our protocols and the existing ones proposed in [20] and [35] , which also fall in the category of secure dot-product. In this table, mul, exp 1 , exp 2 , and C s denote the computational cost of one 2048-bit multiplication, one 1024-bit exponentiation, one 2048-bit exponentiation, and one encryption/decryption over one vector element using 128-bit AES, respectively; d is the number of attributes in a profile vector; k is the number of helping nodes in the collusion resistant mechanism, and γ is a small integer used to indicate the level of interest in the fine-grained profile matching. Given a user profile U =< U 1 , . . . , U d >, the binary presentation of the vector (u) contains (γ − 1)d elements. We will study the impact of these parameters on the computational cost in this section. To make it simpler, we ignore the cost of summation, as it costs much less time than exponentiation and multiplication. 1) Basic Scheme: a) Initiator P a : At the beginning of the protocol, P a encrypts r and (u+r) at the cost of 2(γ −1)d * C s . During the execution of the protocol, P a decrypts s at the cost of (γ − 1)d * C s , computes the dotproduct of < r, s > at the cost of d * mul, and encrypts it at the cost of (γ − 1)d * C s . Thus the total computational cost of P a is 4( So the total cost for all the k helpers is 3kd * C s + kd * mul. Therefore, the total computational cost for our collusion resistant scheme is: 
Therefore, the total computational cost for our verifiable scheme is:
2) SIMULATION RESULTS
To further quantify the computational cost in terms of execution time, we follow the evaluation methodology in [35] . We assume that each user uses a mobile device with a 400 MHz CPU. According to [35] , it takes about 2.4×10 −4 ms, 40 ms, 250 ms, and 2.6 ms to perform one mul, one exp 1 , one exp 2 , and one C s , respectively, as shown in Table  1 . We evaluate the protocols by changing the values of d, k, and γ . As in [35] , we take d = 15 and γ = 5 as default settings. Our schemes introduce a new parameter k as we utilize the helpers. The default value of k is set to be 5, meaning that there are five helpers in the protocol unless otherwise specified. We compare our protocols with existing works under different values of k , and our experiments demonstrate that our schemes perform better than existing ones when k is less than 17. We further assume that two mobile devices communicate with each other through 802.11b interface with a transmission rate of 2 Mbit/s. We compare the computational cost of our protocols to the protocols in [20] and [35] , and we plotted the results as shown in Fig. 5 . Our three protocols are labelled as Protocol 1, 2, 3 in the figure. In Fig. 5(a) , we study the case when d varies, while other parameters are set to be the default values as mentioned before: k = 5 and γ = 5. We vary d from 1 to 30, as 30 attributes should be enough for a user's profile. It is clear that our proposed protocols incur much lower computational cost than the existing works. This is reasonable because our protocols only have efficient symmetric encryption/decryption and multiplication operations, while the existing work utilized expensive homomorphic cryptosystems, which is not practical in real use. Furthermore, it is not surprised to see that the computational cost of all the protocols increases linearly with the value of d, because larger vectors definitely introduce more computational cost.
In Fig. 5(b) , we study the case when k varies, while other parameters are set to be the default values as mentioned VOLUME 5, 2017 before: d = 15 and γ = 5. We let k vary from 1 to 30, as 30 helpers are more than enough for use. We first notice that only the computational cost of the collusion resistant protocol increases linearly with k. This is because the collusion resistant protocol introduces helpers to cooperatively calculate the dot-product, while other protocols do not. One can see that the basic scheme and the verifiable scheme always perform better in terms of computational cost than the compared existing works. The collusion resistant scheme is always more efficient than Dong's protocol and is more efficient than Zhang's protocol when k < 17. However, for real applications, we do not need to use so many helpers to guarantee privacy. Therefore, we conclude that our protocols achieve higher efficiency than the existing ones.
In Fig. 5(c) , we study the case when γ varies, while other parameters are set to be the default values as mentioned before: k = 5 and d = 15. We let γ vary from 1 to 10, which is sufficient to use in real applications. It is clear that our proposed protocols always perform better than Dong's and Zhang's protocols. Furthermore, it is not surprising to see that the computational costs of all the protocols increase linearly with γ , because the vector size becomes larger when γ increases.
It is worth noting that our proposed protocols are readily available for implementation on smartphones, tablets, and other modern mobile devices, as they involve only efficient symmetric encryption/decryption and standard multiplications. Such engineering efforts are part of our ongoing work.
VI. CONCLUSION
With increasing popularity of social networks, a large number of exciting applications are enabled. However, serious privacy concerns have hindered the wide adoption of many of them. Profile matching is an essential function in social networks that needs privacy protection. In this paper, we introduce a novel profile matching framework to compute the dotproduct of two profiles in order to measure their similarity. Instead of resorting to expensive cryptographic algorithms, we propose to preserve the users' privacy by adding a certain amount of noise to it, and carefully assign different shares of the privacy to different parties. While each share reveals no private information, computation based on them can finally lead to the desired dot-product of two private vectors. We first give a detailed introduction of the basic scheme, then propose two enhanced ones by considering collusion resistance and verifiability. We believe that our design is effective in privacy protection and efficient in computational cost. 
